Introduction
The continued exercise of market power depends upon deterring entry. Theory has clarified the range of rational strategies available to an incumbent. To assess whether such strategies are effectively used, we trace the evolution of the American sugar refining industry. We study entry following the formation of the Sugar Trust, later reorganized as the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC), and focus on two sets of entrants, Spreckels and later Arbuckle Brothers and Doscher, who were met with sharp cuts in price. These price wars lasted about two years, with some interruptions, and included extended periods in which the price-cost margin fell to zero or below. We interpret these price wars as pr?dation by ASRC.
Our evidence is based in part upon a direct comparison of price to marginal cost. As argued in Genesove and Mullin (1998), the simple technology of sugar refining and contemporary audits and testimony combine to provide a direct and credible measure of marginal cost. Because cost estimates can be controversial, we present a second test, based on competitive models, firms' capacities, and demand estimates. Using these, we construct predicted competitive price-cost margins and show that they exceed observed margins. This conclusion is robust to our measure of marginal cost, as it holds even when the non-raw-sugar component of marginal cost is assumed to be zero.
D
Entry. Although the near uniformity of costs suggests a common, known technology, entrants were drawn from a limited pool, being typically either owners who had sold out in the 1887 consolidation, or their brothers or sons, as noted by Eichner (1969) . The exceptions are Arbuckle Brothers and Segal. However, Arbuckle Brothers had the patented packaging machine.
Moreover,
it had developed merchandizing expertise while selling repackaged ASRC-produced sugar, and then acquired production expertise by hiring the superintendent of ASRC's Boston plant. As for Segal, he never really proved he was capable of constructing a workable refinery. 15 In 1900, the cost of a one-million-pound refinery ranged from $1.5 to $2.5 million, most of which was sunk, as the plant and machinery were almost entirely specific to the industry. As refiner Claus Doscher testified "If anything turns up that makes your plant useless for sugar refining, you have got nothing left that is worth anything for anything else."16 The costly waterfront land was also developed in a specialized manner. Indeed, our research has uncovered only a single conversion of a sugar cane refinery to some other manufacturing purpose from 1887 through the 1930s.
An additional estimated $2.0 million in working capital was needed for the stock of raw sugar and for credit to brokers.17 This, of course, was not sunk.
Entry was far from instant. Building a refinery?a several-story structure, with adjacent warehouses and docks?took from a year to eighteen months. Production started at a low level, as machinery was tested and fixed. It took a month or more for production to reach capacity, with substantial uncertainty over when production would start.18 D Models of competition. Our second test for pr?dation checks whether observed margins fell below those predicted by static models of competition. Here we review these models, specialized to the technological conditions of the sugar refining industry. The combination of identical constant marginal cost until capacity, a capacity that exceeds demand at marginal cost for one firm and small capacities for the rest (K) implies similar, if not identical, outcomes. We supplement these models with demand estimates based on Genesove and Mullin (1998). That article estimated static pricing models for 1890-1914, and found that industry pricing during non-price-war periods was more competitive than one might expect given the industry's structure. We use competitive and not collusive models because the former predicts lower margins and so provides a stronger test for pr?dation. In Section 6 we consider (but reject) dynamic, competitive models as an alternative to our pr?dation explanation.
A useful benchmark is the dominant firm and competitive fringe model, which assumes price taking by all firms other than one large firm, here ASRC. Because marginal cost is constant until capacity, there is no price responsiveness by the fringe for prices exceeding marginal costs; whatever price above c that ASRC sets, the fringe will always produce to capacity. (Of course, the fringe won't produce anything if price falls below c.)19 In this model, the equilibrium price (pd) is that which maximizes profits according to ASRC's residual demand, D(p) ? K, which is the difference between market demand and fringe capacity. The fringe profits are (pd ? c)K. Other models yield similar results. The Cournot equilibrium is identical to the dominant firm equilibrium, so long as the fringe's capacity is sufficiently small (i.e., less than the per-firm Cournot output in the absence of capacity constraints). The Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with efficient rationing, while in mixed strategies, is also similar. Here we offer a second test, one that substitutes knowledge about demand and capacity for cost. Employing the demand estimates from Section 3, we calculate the dominant firm price, pd, both before and after entry. We find that observed prices fell too low to be the product of dominant firm or Bertrand pricing in the face of enlarged fringe capacity. To remove uncertainty over costs as a source of skepticism of our results, we calculate pd for three values of c0 : zero ,160, and 260.
Assuming c0 = 0 corresponds to ignoring the testimony and auditing information of Section 3. By undervaluing marginal cost, the calculated pd at 00 will underestimate the true dominant firm price and thus bias our results against the conclusion that prices were too low to be rationalized by competition. Assuming c0 = 160 adopts our lower bound estimate from Section 3; assuming c0 = 260 adopts our upper bound. In all cases, we focus on the predicted pd for the period after both Arbuckle Brothers and Doscher had entered. Time ASRC producing more than Arbuckle Brothers and Doscher, a higher margin, with no change in production levels, would benefit it more than the latter in absolute terms, though the proportional effect would be the same. With production higher, and its rivals' capacity constrained, ASRC's benefit from the respite would be greater proportionately as well.
We operationalize the price of pr?dation by computing a loss ratio: the ratio of ASRC's loss from the price war to the rivals' loss. The cost of the price war at any point in time was the excess of nonpredatory profits over predatory profits. Nonpredatory profits we take to be fully accommodative?in the sense of ASRC restricting its output one for one with the capacity of the entrant, thus maintaining the price.30 As an initial simplification, we assume that pr?dation called for marginal cost pricing, so that predatory profits for all firms were zero. Since all firms face the same price-cost margin, the loss ratio then simplifies to ASRC's (counterfactual) nonpredatory output, divided by the capacity of the entrant (Ke). We predict nonpredatory total output ( LR\ reaches its maximum during the respite. Interestingly, the price war pauses and then resumes when LR\ is near 4. Thus, at that stage of the war, ASRC was willing to pay $4 to reduce the entrants' profits by $1, but was not willing to pay more than that. The demand for pr?dation is downward sloping! These initial calculations falsely assume that predatory prices were set at marginal cost. To correct for that, we subtract from the usual profits the actual profits of ASRC and the entrants, under the assumption that all fringe firms produced at capacity. We therefore calculate a second loss ratio, which we also display in Our explanation for why the fringe did not fully shut down introduces additional benefits and costs not covered by price and our estimate of c0: shut-down and start-up costs, reputation, and the value of packaging. However, so long as these considerations enter the fringe's costs only, they invalidate neither the cost-based test of pr?dation, for which only ASRC's costs are relevant, nor the second test; as Section 3 noted, a lower fringe cost will leave the dominant firm and lower Bertrand prices unchanged, while a higher fringe cost will render our calculation a lower bound for the true counterfactual proper margin.
We argue that this is indeed the case. The basic argument, first made by Klemperer (1989), is that entrants must initially price below the incumbent's prevailing price to induce buyers to switch, causing the incumbent to lower its price part-way in response, lest entrants steal too many of its customers. The price cuts in the formal models are large, even when switching costs are small: because there is a continuum of entrants, each earns zero profits; because buyers are subsequently locked in, postentry margins are positive; thus entrants' margins are negative in the entry period.
We would not expect such large effects in the sugar industry, however. Entering firms need not earn zero profits, since the set of potential entrants was small. Moreover, the entrant would not price so low, and the incumbent would not respond as much, since the entrant's capacity limits the number of customers it can steal. The extent of the price cuts would only be on the order of the switching cost, then. Without knowing the actual switching costs distribution, however, we cannot say much about the extent of their likely effect on prices?and so how well a switching cost model might fit the average margins in the two entry episodes we have discussed. that an incumbent has low costs will lower the minimum buyout price that the rival would accept. Assuming the fringe produces at capacity, that price would be the net present value of (p ? Cf)K?, where Cf is the fringe's cost. Thus, the gross per-period return to ASRC of pr?dation was K?Ac(dp/dc), where Ac is the difference between high and low cost, and dp/dc is the responsiveness of price to increases in the incumbent's cost in nonpredatory periods.
Nonetheless
Signalling cost by a sudden price cut might seem unconvincing for an incumbent that has been setting prices weekly for several years before entry, although one might argue that price is more revealing about cost the more competitive the circumstances. Whatever the case, the plausible range of a rival's beliefs about ASRC's costs is too small to justify a signalling explanation. Although we do not know what the precise beliefs were, we do know that the actual cost differences across firms were small. Section 3 quoted Industrial Commission testimony that assessed the possible cost advantage as 3 to 50 per hundred.47 Using the higher real 50 figure for Ac, a value of .93 for dp/dc (from Genesove and Mullin's (1998) estimate of the response of the refined price to the raw price, adjusted for the loss in sugar refining), and Doscher, Mollenhauer, and the National's combined capacity of 2.87 million pounds, we obtain a yearly gross return of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), a sugar refinery was an industry-specific asset, and ASRC's pr?dation was an industry-specific shock to liquidity.
Although the long purse story is a possible mechanism for reducing acquisition costs, we do not emphasize it, as we lack evidence of it, such as creditor pressure on the fringe firms, or nonpayment of accounts. In contrast, we do have such evidence for reputation, as seen in the manipulation of rivals' beliefs about competitive conditions, which we turn to now. war, from a yearly rate of 613,000 pounds per day to 347,000 after the war.51 Were this decline all ascribed to ASRC's pr?dation after the Arbuckle Brothers-Doscher entries, could it, of itself, rationalize the predatory losses? The predatory gain under that hypothesis is the difference between the net present value of ASRC's dominant firm profits given the two entry flows. This calculation requires an assumed price of raw sugar (with the predatory gain declining in the price of raw sugar), and an "initial" fringe capacity level.52
The results depend crucially on the fringe capacity level. If the new National's capacity is included in the fringe capacity, then the maximum IRR is 3.2%. However, if the National's capacity is excluded (as it was under the control of the ASRC president), the internal rates of return increase substantially. At a raw sugar price of $3 (the postentry average), the IRR is 14.8%.
It falls to 10.0% for raw sugar selling at $3.35 (the "interwar average," and our preferred value), and 6.6% for $3.50 (the 1890-1897 average).
Thus the predatory investment can be rationalized by its effect of deterring additional entry only when combined with the anticipated acquisition of the fringe firms.
D
Bargaining. Finally, although Arbuckle Brothers was not bought out, pr?dation could still have shifted its profits to ASRC. Under this scenario, ASRC's goal was a larger share of output, and so profits, in a post-price-war collusive equilibrium. As shown in our working paper, Genesove and Mullin (1997), a range of fringe output is sustainable in a collusive equilibrium. Furthermore, in such an equilibrium the fringe must produce less than capacity, for otherwise ASRC could at most earn its dominant firm profits?and so could not be punished for deviating. Yet the last two columns of Table Al Reputation models require potential entrants to ascribe a positive probability to the predator preying for reasons other than to establish a reputation. Reputation is built by mimicking the actions of those who would act that way in any case. There is no shortage of reasons to prey: to signal a low cost, and so acquire a firm at lower price; to achieve a larger share of a postentry collusive agreement; to force a financially constrained firm to sell out. We have rejected the first two as likely sole explanations for ASRC's behavior because the IRR was too low, and the third because of the lack of confirmatory evidence. But that is not to say that ASRC's rivals would have assessed no chance of it requiring a lower rate of return than what we calculated for the first two, nor imagined that ASRC thought that they thought ASRC's costs might be much 51 This is the period from the post-Spreckels consolidation up to, and including, the Arbuckle Brothers and Doscher entries. 52 We assume entry stops when the dominant-firm price has decreased to the sum of marginal production cost and the annualized per-unit cost of capacity. We take the unit cost of capacity as 20 per pound, corresponding to the cost of physical capital discussed in Section 3. The results were invariant to using zero or 40 per pound a day (to include working capital) instead. 1989, 1992) suggest, the greater the entrants' subjective probability that the dominant firm would want to prey other than for reputational reasons, the shorter the number of periods necessary to establish a reputation, during which time the predator must suffer entry and the consequent price wars. Thus, reputation will be most effective the more profitable is pr?dation in and of itself. Admittedly, demonstrating that the conditions were in place for the reputation mechanism to operate places us in a rhetorical bind, for in arguing for it we must attach some plausibility to mechanisms that we have already rejected. However, the calculated rates of return turn out to be just right for our argument?too low to justify the pr?dation by themselves, but not so low that an entrant could reasonably dismiss the possibility that ASRC would decide to prey on that basis.
Empirically, reputation is distinguishable from other mechanisms of pr?dation in its increasing effectiveness over time, as potential entrants become more convinced that the dominant firm is a willing predator. Unfortunately for us, ASRC's predatory behavior was cut short by antitrust authorities, preventing us from examining whether buyout prices decreased with the number of predatory incidents, as Burns (1986) did. However, the timing of the major entry episodes and associated pr?dations are consistent with a growing reputation. It took only two years for Spreckels to enter and be preyed upon after the formation of the Sugar Trust in 1887. But it then took seven years after the Spreckels war for ASRC's adjusted capacity share to fall below 80%. And after the Arbuckle Brothers-Doscher war, ASRC retained at least that capacity share for about 11 years, until it relinquished control of the new National for antitrust reasons. Furthermore, the manner in which the Philadelphia refiners were acquired points very strongly to a manipulation of rivals' beliefs.
Was entry profitable?
A complete account of predatory pricing must explain the behavior of entrants. There are four essential points.
The pool of potential entrants was limited, as it required rare human capital that was usually employed by an incumbent. Entry required an industry-specific sunk investment in a refinery. The return on the investment was uncertain, since future price-cost margins depended on future entry and ASRC's response to it. Entrants could not know whether or not pr?dation would occur and, if it did, for how long.53
Finally, entrants differed. Some had an additional, strategic value to entry. Arbuckle Brothers had its packaging technology, while Spreckels wished to protect his West Coast monopoly. And these firms, controlling other profitable businesses and therefore having access to internal funds, could be less vulnerable to long purse pr?dation, and so more willing to enter, than stand-alone entrants. From the viewpoint of earlier entrants, subsequent entrants were random events that adversely affected their profitability.
The rationality of entry is determined ex ante, when the investment was sunk. Ex post profitability is, nonetheless, revealing, as it suggests that the actions were ex ante rational. 
